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1 Introduction
The great recession that followed the recent global nancial crisis has spurred a renewed
interest in the assessment of the real e¤ects of credit shocks. One problem faced with
the identication of this type of shocks in earlier studies is the di¢ culty to disentangle
credit supply shocks from their demand counterparts (e.g. Bernanke and Lown (1991) and
Trautwein (2000)). Recent quantitative methods o¤er some solutions to this identication
problem by allowing to impose theoretical justiable sign restrictions on impulse response
functions (e.g. Canova and Nicolo (2002), Faust (1998), and Uhlig (2005)). For instance,
Meeks (2012) applies this method to the USA and nds that credit supply shocks impact
signicantly on real activity but their overall role in driving macroeconomic uctuations is
limited. On the contrary, Gilchrist et al. (2009) use a recursive identication scheme and
present evidence suggesting that these shocks account for a larger share of output uctuations
in the USA.
Helbling et al. (2011) provide a global analysis on credit supply shocks. Using the sign
restriction identication scheme they nd that global credit supply shocks account for a
similar share as global productivity shocks for real activity in G-7 countries. Moreover, they
document that credit supply shocks have been more important in the 2007   2009 global
recession as compared to the 1990   1991 episode. Related studies on Europe employing
sign restrictions report mixed results (e.g. Abildgren (2012), Busch et al. (2010), Halvorsen
and Jacobsen (2009) and Torsten and Zwick (2012) Hristov et al. (2012)). On the one
hand, Hristov et al. (2012) and Halvorsen and Jacobsen (2009) nd that loan supply shocks
play a minor role for output uctuations in the Euro Area and the UK, respectively. Even
Abildgren (2012) argue that lending supply shocks have no e¤ects on output in Denmark in
1922 1949 and 1981 2011. On the other hand, Halvorsen and Jacobsen (2009) and Busch
et al. (2010) nd that loan supply shocks account for a larger share of output uctuation in
Norway and Germany, respectively. In a related study Gambetti and Musso (2012) employ
the identication scheme based on sign restrictions within time varying BVAR models. They
nd that loan supply shocks account for about 20% of the variance of real activity in UK, USA
and the Euro Area. Moreover, they argue that these shocks have increased in importance in
recent years.
While this literature is growing, it almost entirely focuses on advanced countries. To the
best of our knowledge only Tamasi and Vilagi (2011) explicitly identify credit supply shocks
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for EMEs. They employ a BVAR model with sign restrictions and report that credit supply
shocks account for a larger share of output uctuations in Hungary. Other related studies
have mainly used regression techniques to document a positive co-movement between credit
and real activity (e.g. Akinboade and Makina (2010)). However, in such a framework is it
di¢ cult to distinguish correlation from causality. Moreover, such techniques do not system-
atically analyze non-expected shocks. For research studying international transmission of
credit shocks to EMEs; see Schnabl (ming) and Cetorelli and Goldberg (2010)).
In this paper, we examine the role of global and domestic credit supply shocks in macro-
economic uctuations in Emerging Markets (EMEs). For this purpose, we use a medium-
scale Bayesian Vector Auto-Regressive (BVAR) model and employ a set of zero and sign
restrictions. On the one hand, zero restrictions allow to disentangle domestic from global
shocks. In particular, we assume that G7 countries do not respond to shocks originating from
EMEs. This type of identication restriction has been used in other contexts. However, to
our knowledge, this is the rst time it is used to analyze the economic impacts of global
versus domestic credit supply shocks. Knowing the origin of credit supply shocks will help
design appropriate macroprudential policies.
On the other hand, sign restrictions are used to distinguish credit supply shocks from
credit demand shocks. Especially, credit demand shocks capture endogenous responses of
credit market indicators to fundamental shocks whereas credit supply shocks are the varia-
tions in these indicators that are unrelated to fundamentals (see e.g. Helbling et al. (2011)
and Meeks (2012)). For instance, following adverse credit supply shocks we require that the
volume of credit and default rates do not increase. In the case of adverse credit demand
shocks we also require a drop in the volume of credit but we impose that default rates cannot
decrease. We consider two types of fundamental shocks that drive credit demand shocks:
productivity shocks and aggregate demand shocks. Evaluating credit supply shocks against
these two fundamental shocks may improve identication because the response of ination to
credit supply shocks is not signed a priory. One the one hand, negative credit supply shocks
may lead to more ination via the increase of the cost of credit or/and real wages (see,
e.g., Gerali et al., 2010 and Atta-Mensah and Dib, 2008). On the other hand, credit supply
shocks may decrease ination because of the contraction of aggregate demand induced by
the decrease of credit volume (see, e.g., Curdia and Woodford, 2010).
In the implementation we proxy global shocks by G7-shocks. For EMEs data availability
forces us to choose South Africa (SA). In total we identify six orthogonal shocks: G7-credit
shocks, G7-productivity shocks, G7-demand, SA-credit shocks, SA-productivity shocks, and
SA-demand shocks. We study the impacts of various shocks through the analysis of impulse
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response functions and variance decomposition. In addition, counterfactual analysis is used
to examine the role of each shock in three South African recessions: 1990 : 1   1992 : 2;
1996 : 3  1999 : 1 and 2007 : 3  2010 : 3. Moreover, we study three transmission channels
of G7-shocks to South Africa: credit, trade volume, and commodity price channels (see for
instance, Broda (2004) Deaton and Miller (1996) Ho¤maister and Roldós (1997); Ho¤maister
et al. (1998), Houssa (2008b,a), Houssa et al. (2010) and Kose (2002), Kose and Riezman
(2001), Mendoza (1995), Chia and Alba (2006)).
In addition to contributing to the current debate, there are at least three reasons for
studying credit shocks for EMEs. First, nancial intermediaries are the main nancing
sources in these economies. As such, credit supply shocks might play di¤erent roles in
business cycles. Second, EMEs have increasingly become major players at the global level
by intensifying their trade and nancial linkages with advanced countries but also with
Low Income Countries (LICs). In this context, understanding shocks originating from these
economies will provide insights on the evolution of the global business cycles. Third, there
is a large literature on international business cycles but their transmission channels are not
well understood. Our study contributes to this debate by examining di¤erent channels of
global shocks to South Africa at specic times.
Quarterly data from South Africa and G7 countries in 1985 : 1   2010 : 3 indicate
that domestic and global credit supply shocks have played a statistically signicant role
on macroeconomic aggregates in these economies. However, fundamental shocks remain
the main drivers of macroeconomic uctuations in G7 countries but also in South Africa.
Shocks originating from G7-countries account for the larger share of the variation in real
activity in South Africa, although they played a marginal role in the 1996   1999 South
African recession. Moreover, the three type of G7-shocks have contributed signicantly to
the 2007 : 4   2010 : 3 recession whereas productivity shocks were the main drivers of real
activity in the 1990 : 1  1992 : 2 episode:
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the BVARmodel
and discusses the structural identication strategy. Section 3 presents empirical results.
Section 4 concludes.
3
2 Methodology
2.1 Bayesian Vector Auto-Regressive (BVAR) Model
Consider the following Vector Auto-Regressive (V AR) model,
Yt = A0 + A1Yt 1 + :::+ APYt P + t; (1)
where Yt is a 16  1 vector of real, nominal and nancial indicators on G7-countries and
South Africa, the Ai are 16 16 auto-regressive coe¢ cients, A0 contains the constant terms,
and t is a 16 1 vector of Gaussian white noise with covariance matrix 	 = E(t0t).
We estimate Eq. (1) using Bayesian methods with 3 lags and a combination of two types
of priors: i) a Normal-inverted Wishart prior; and ii) a Minnesota type prior that assigns low
weights on o¤-diagonal AR coe¢ cients and specically zeros weights on coe¢ cients related
to South African indicators in the block dened by commodity prices and G7-factors.1 We
estimate four G7-factors by extracting the rst principal component from the series of G7
countries: G7-real GDP; G7-ination; G7-real credit; and G7-short-term interest rates. In
addition, we use two US series in the G7-block: US-credit spread and US-default rates. The
remaining 10 series contained in Yt relate to the South African economy.
We derive quarterly data from South Africa and G7-countries in 1985 : 1   2010 : 3.
Where appropriate we transform the series in year to year growth rates. Table 1 reports
detailed information on the dataset and the transformation applied to each series. For the
South African economy we measure credit spread by the di¤erence between the yield on
Eskom and the US baa bond. As a proxy for the default rate we make use of data on the
number of insolvency on loans. For G7 we use the US corporate credit spreads: baa-aaa.
For a measure default rate for G7 we also use a proxy for the US economy. In particular, we
use the distance to default measure proposed by Gilchrist et al. (2009). We take the inverse
of this indicator and transform it to year to year growth rate.
2.2 Structural Identication
We employ a set of zero and sign restrictions. These restrictions are implemented with the
penalty function approach proposed byMountford and Uhlig (2009) and Uhlig (2005). We ex-
plicitly modify the objective function in order to impose both zero and sign restrictions. The
results reported in the paper are based on the following sequential ordering: G7-credit shocks,
1The results reported in the paper are based on 250 draws. Using a larger number of draws leaves
qualitatively the results unchanged.
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G7-productivity shocks, G7-demand shocks, SA-credit shocks, SA-productivity shocks, and
SA-demand shocks. However, using di¤erent ordering does not change the main results of
the paper. Table 2 reports the identication restrictions for the six shocks. In all cases, the
restrictions assume negative shocks and are imposed over the rst four quarters.
Zero restrictions allow to disentangle South African shocks from global shocks. In partic-
ular, we assume that G7 countries do not respond to shocks originating from South Africa.
On the other hand, sign restrictions help to distinguish credit supply shocks from credit
demand shocks. Especially, credit demand shocks capture endogenous responses of credit
market indicators to fundamental shocks whereas credit supply shocks are the variations in
these indicators that are unrelated to fundamentals.
The identication of credit supply shocks is based on Helbling et al. (2011) and Meeks
(2012). We assume that an adverse credit supply shock is characterized by an increase in
the credit spread and a decrease in real credit. In addition, we require that default rates on
corporate bonds do not increase. This additional restriction helps to isolate the endogenous
response of credit to fundamental macroeconomic shocks (see Meeks (2012)). Note that we
leave unrestricted the IRFs of Real GDP, ination, the monetary policy rate and other series.
For adverse productivity and aggregate demand shocks, we also impose that the volume
of credit decreases. However, we also require for these shocks that default rates do not
decrease. Finally, we use additional restrictions to discriminate between productivity shocks
and aggregate demand shocks. Especially, we assume that productivity shocks generate a
negative comovement between output and ination whereas aggregate demand shocks imply
a positive comovement between the two indicators.
3 Empirical Results
3.1 Estimated Shocks
Figures 1 and 2 report the median together with the 16th and 84th percentiles of the esti-
mated shocks.2
The narrowness of the majority of credible intervals suggests that the shocks are precisely
estimated.
The estimated shocks capture the main events that occurred at the global level and
in South Africa in the last decades. In particular, the estimated G7-shocks mimic the
uctuations of the global business cycles presented in the literature (e.g. Gregory et al.
2The data have been normalized such that positive numbers represent favorable shocks.
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Figure 1: Estimated G7-shocks
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Figure 2: Estimated South African Shocks
SA-Credit
1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
-3.0
-1.0
1.0
3.0
SA-Productivity
1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
-3.0
-1.0
1.0
3.0
SA-Demand
1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
-2.5
-1.5
-0.5
0.5
1.5
9
(1997), Kose et al. (2003) and Kose et al. (2003)). For instance, our estimated G7-shocks
show large negative deviations in 2007   2009, corresponding to the recent nancial crisis
and the associated great recession (Figure 1). The data also show that positive demand
developments play an important role in the rst stage of the recovery from the great recession.
The G7-credit and productivity shocks capture the global recession that occurred in the early
1990s following the USA credit crunch in 1991, the crisis in the European Exchange Rate
Mechanism, and the oil shock related to the Gulf war in Iraq. In the same way these two
shocks are in line with the global recession of the early 2000s, coinciding with the bursting
of the equity market and information technology bubbles.
The estimated South African shocks capture specic events (Figure 2). For instance,
contrary to the G7 shocks, the South African shocks do not display any signicant negative
deviations during the great recession period. Only the South African productivity shocks
indicate a small negative deviation in early-2008, corresponding to the electricity power
shortage that happened in the country.
The negative movements in the domestic shocks before mid-1995 coincided with a num-
ber of events including a severe drought, problems in the mining sector but also social and
political developments. The latter caused a deterioration in investorscondence and en-
couraged foreign banks to withdraw funds from the country (see, e.g., South African Reserve
Bank (1995) and Van der Walt and Pretorius (1995)).
The domestic credit supply and productivity shocks exhibit signicant negative deviations
in the second half of the 1990s and earlier 2000s coincided with the Asian and Russian
nancial crisis in 1997   1998 and nancial crises in Brazil and Argentina in early 2000,
adverse gold price shocks in 1995   1997; the banking crisis in 2002, which resulted in the
collapse of a number of banks in South Africa (see, e.g., South African Reserve Bank (2005),
Venter and Pretorius (2001) and Venter (2009)).
3.2 Dynamic Responses Analysis
Figures 3 to 5 display the median together with the 16th and 84th percentiles of the dynamic
responses to the six shocks. In general the unconstrained IRFs are in line with intuition.
For instance, the IRFs to the domestic and global credit supply shocks impact signi-
cantly on real activity. Especially, the global credit shocks cause recessions in both the G7
countries and in South Africa. In the same way the domestic credit supply shocks contracts
signicantly real activity in South Africa.
The global credit shocks raise signicantly G7-ination on impact but reduces it later
10
Figure 3: Dynamic responses to credit shocks
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Figure 4: Dynamic responses to productivity shocks
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Figure 5: Dynamic responses to demand shocks
G7-Demand
G7-GDP
0 2 4 6 8 10
-2.0
-1.2
-0.4
0.4
1.2
G7-Inflation
0 2 4 6 8 10
-1.3
-1.0
-0.7
-0.4
-0.1
G7-Credit
0 2 4 6 8 10
-1.4
-0.8
-0.2
0.4
1.0
G7-short term IR
0 2 4 6 8 10
-1.6
-1.2
-0.8
-0.4
0.0
US-Spread
0 2 4 6 8 10
-0.1
-0.0
0.0
0.1
0.1
US-Default
0 2 4 6 8 10
-10.0
0.0
10.0
20.0
SA-commodity Price
0 2 4 6 8 10
-14.0
-8.0
-2.0
4.0
10.0
SA-GDP
0 2 4 6 8 10
-0.3
-0.1
0.1
0.3
0.5
SA-Inflation
0 2 4 6 8 10
-1.0
-0.7
-0.4
-0.1
0.2
SA-Credit
0 2 4 6 8 10
-1.0
-0.4
0.2
0.8
1.4
SA-short term IR
0 2 4 6 8 10
-0.4
-0.3
-0.1
0.0
0.2
SA-Spread
0 2 4 6 8 10
-0.3
-0.2
-0.0
0.1
0.3
SA-Default
0 2 4 6 8 10
-6.0
-4.0
-2.0
0.0
2.0
SA-Real Eff. Ex. Rate
0 2 4 6 8 10
-8.0
-5.0
-2.0
1.0
4.0
SA-Export
0 2 4 6 8 10
-3.0
-2.0
-1.0
0.0
1.0
SA-Import
0 2 4 6 8 10
-2.5
-1.3
0.0
1.3
SA-Demand
G7-GDP
0 2 4 6 8 10
-0.0
-0.0
-0.0
0.0
0.0
G7-Inflation
0 2 4 6 8 10
-0.0
-0.0
-0.0
0.0
0.0
G7-Credit
0 2 4 6 8 10
-0.0
-0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
G7-short term IR
0 2 4 6 8 10
-0.0
-0.0
-0.0
0.0
0.0
US-Spread
0 2 4 6 8 10
-0.0
-0.0
-0.0
0.0
US-Default
0 2 4 6 8 10
-0.1
-0.1
-0.1
-0.0
0.0
SA-commodity Price
0 2 4 6 8 10
-0.0
-0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
SA-GDP
0 2 4 6 8 10
-0.4
-0.3
-0.2
-0.0
0.1
SA-Inflation
0 2 4 6 8 10
-0.7
-0.5
-0.3
-0.1
0.1
SA-Credit
0 2 4 6 8 10
-0.9
-0.6
-0.3
-0.0
SA-short term IR
0 2 4 6 8 10
-0.1
-0.1
0.0
0.1
SA-Spread
0 2 4 6 8 10
-0.1
-0.0
0.1
0.1
0.2
SA-Default
0 2 4 6 8 10
-4.0
-1.0
2.0
5.0
8.0
SA-Real Eff. Ex. Rate
0 2 4 6 8 10
-1.5
-0.5
0.5
1.5
2.5
SA-Export
0 2 4 6 8 10
-2.3
-1.3
-0.3
0.8
SA-Import
0 2 4 6 8 10
-3.0
-1.0
1.0
3.0
13
around six quarters. The domestic credit supply shocks generate a similar inationary pres-
sures on impact in South Africa but these e¤ects persist over six quarters. These ination
pressures of credit supply shocks are in line with the models presented in Atta-Mensah and
Dib (2008) and Gerali et al. (2010) whereas the negative ination e¤ect of the second phase
are supported by the models presented in Curdia and Woodford (2010). Despite the initial
inationary e¤ects our results show that the monetary authorities ease their policy certainty
because credit supply shocks generate a deeper recession.
Concentrating on the impacts of external shocks on South Africa in general the data
reported in Figures 3 to 5 show that adverse global shocks have caused recessions in South
Africa although the results are not statistically signicant for aggregate demand shocks. In
line with these ndings global productivity and credit supply shocks increase the probability
of rms to default in South Africa. As in the case of global credit shocks the South African
Reserve Bank (SARB) also accommodates the global productivity and aggregate demand
shocks. Moreover, the global shocks transmit to South Africa through three channels: trade
linkages, credit channels and primary commodity price channels.
Turning to the domestic shocks the data show that credit spreads increase in the events of
averse productivity and aggregate demand shocks. Moreover, export and imports contracts.
As such, the SARB accommodates these shocks as well.
3.3 Variance Decomposition Analysis
Figures 6 to 8 report the median of the percentage share of the variance attributed to each
of the six shocks.
The results can be summarized in the following three points. First, the global shocks
explained the main variations of macroeconomic aggregates in South Africa. Concentrating
on the 3-year horizon variance decomposition (VD) of real activity in South Africa, the global
demand shocks play the dominant role3 and the two remaining global shocks explain about
the same share. A similar result holds true for the VD of the G7-output. The nding that
the global credit supply shocks account for a similar share as global productivity shocks for
real activity in G-7 countries is in line with Helbling et al. (2011). However, our estimates
suggest this share to be about 15% whereas Helbling et al. (2011) nd 12%.
Second, at the 3-year horizon the global shocks also account for the main variation of
the South African ination. In the short-run, however, domestic shocks play the dominant
role. Especially, the domestic productivity shocks explain the largest share of the variance of
3In the short-run, however, the domestic productivity shocks is more important.
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Figure 6: Variance explained by credit shocks
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Figure 7: Variance explained by productivity shocks
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Figure 8: Variance explained by demand shocks
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ination in the short-run. In the short-run domestic productivity shocks also has the largest
variance share of real activity in South Africa.
Third, the VD of other macroeconomic aggregates show a similar pattern. For instance,
the variations of credit, default rates and credit spreads in South Africa are dominated
by global shocks in the 3-year horizon. In the short run, however, domestic shocks are
more important. Especially, domestic credit supply shocks explain the largest share of these
indicators at the short-run horizon. Finally, the VD of the policy interest rate is dominated
by global shocks.
3.4 Counterfactual Analysis
A nal tool we use for studying the shocks is counterfactual analysis where, we examine the
impact of the shocks at specic periods. In particular, we study the impacts of the three
shocks in three periods where the South African economy experienced recessions: 1990 :
1   1992 : 2; 1996 : 3   1999 : 1 and 2007 : 4   2010 : 3: Figures 9 to 14 report the results.
The thin (blue) line represents the observed data whereas the tick (dark) line denotes the
median dynamics of the series in the absence of a shock.
In line with the results presented above the data show that the global shocks have con-
tributed the most to the decline of real activity in South Africa in 1990 : 1   1992 : 2 and
2007 : 4 2010 : 3. In 1996 : 3 1999 : 1; however, the domestic shocks have played the major
role. This result is not surprising given the events behind the downturn of 1996 : 3 1999 : 1
had to due more with issues related to South Africa and other EMEs as discussed above.
Our results also show that the trade and the credit linkages are the main transmission
channels of global shocks to South Africa in 2007 : 4  2010 : 3 whereas in 1990 : 1 1992 : 2
the commodity price channel were the dominant channels. This result could be interpreted
as the increase of globalization in recent years. However, one should also keep in mind that
South Africa faced a number of economic and nancial sanctions before 1994 as a result of
Apartheid.
4 Conclusion
In this paper, we analyze the role of domestic and global credit shocks in explaining business
cycles in Emerging Markets Economies (EMEs). For this purpose, we use a medium-scale
Bayesian Vector Auto-Regressive (BVAR) model that captures the main dynamics of 16
macroeconomic indicators in G7-countries and in South Africa. Moreover, we employ a set
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of zeros and sign restrictions. Quarterly data in 1985 : 1  2010 : 3 show that credit supply
shocks impact signicantly on macroeconomic uctuations in both the G7-countries and
South Africa. However, the fundamental shocks remain the main drivers of real activity.
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